Ricoh Aficio MP 2852 Security Target - Page 76

Table 3334 : Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements

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Page 75 of 91 (1) Generate appropriate cryptographic keys. FCS_CKM.1 generates the cryptographic key for encryption. (2) Perform cryptographic operation. FCS_COP.1 encrypts the data to be stored in the HDD, and decrypts the data to be read from the HDD. (3) Manage the TSF data. FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator to manage the cryptographic keys. (4) Specification of Management Function. FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function. (5) Specification of the roles. FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges. By satisfying FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is fulfilled. O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT Protection of communication with RC Gate O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is the security objective to ensure the communication data between the TOE and RC Gate are concealed, and any tampering on the communication path is detected. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasure. (1) Use trusted channel for the communication with RC Gate FTP_ITC.1 allows the TOE to establish the communication that protects the data from tampering and disclosure for the communication between the TOE and RC Gate. By satisfying FTP_ITC.1, which is the security functional requirement for this countermeasure, O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is fulfilled. 6.3.3 Dependency Analysis Table 3334 shows the result of dependency analysis in this ST for the TOE security functional requirements. Table 3334 : Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements TOE Security Functional Requirements FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.4 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.2 FCS_CKM.1 Claimed Dependencies FPT_STM.1 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1 [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] Dependencies Satisfied in ST FPT_STM.1 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1 FCS_COP.1 Dependencies Not Satisfied in ST None None None None None None FCS_CKM.4 Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

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Page 75 of
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Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
(1)
Generate appropriate cryptographic keys.
FCS_CKM.1 generates the cryptographic key for encryption.
(2)
Perform cryptographic operation.
FCS_COP.1 encrypts the data to be stored in the HDD, and decrypts the data to be read from the HDD.
(3)
Manage the TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator to manage the cryptographic keys.
(4)
Specification of Management Function.
FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
(5)
Specification of the roles.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
By satisfying FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1, which are the
security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is fulfilled.
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
Protection of communication with RC Gate
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is the security objective to ensure the communication data between the TOE
and RC Gate are concealed, and any tampering on the communication path is detected. To fulfil this security
objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasure.
(1)
Use trusted channel for the communication with RC Gate
FTP_ITC.1 allows the TOE to establish the communication that protects the data from tampering and
disclosure for the communication between the TOE and RC Gate.
By satisfying FTP_ITC.1, which is the security functional requirement for this countermeasure,
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is fulfilled.
6.3.3
Dependency Analysis
Table 3334 shows the result of dependency analysis in this ST for the TOE security functional requirements.
Table 3334 : Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Claimed
Dependencies
Dependencies
Satisfied in ST
Dependencies
Not Satisfied in
ST
FAU_GEN.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_STM.1
None
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
None
FAU_STG.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_STG.4
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.1
None
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.1
None
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4