Ricoh Aficio MP 3352 Security Target - Page 51

FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

Page 51 highlights

Page 50 of 91 FTP_ITC.1 a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channel functions. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted channel functions. d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and target of all trusted channel functions. a) Minimal: Failure of communication with trusted channel. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection: prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [assignment: no other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: the MFP administrators] with the capability to read [assignment: all of log items] from the audit records. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

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Page 50 of
91
Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FTP_ITC.1
a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted
channel functions.
b) Minimal: Identification of the
initiator and target of failed trusted
channel functions.
c) Basic: All attempted uses of the
trusted channel functions.
d) Basic: Identification of the initiator
and target of all trusted channel
functions.
a) Minimal: Failure of
communication with trusted
channel.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to
[selection: prevent]
unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to:
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies:
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall
[selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records]
and
[assignment: no
other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
if the audit trail
is full
.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide
[assignment: the MFP administrators]
with the capability to read
[assignment: all of log items]
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2
Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review