HP Evo Notebook n200 Wireless Security - Page 23

Authentication, Authorization, Encryption, Data Integrity, Non-repudiation, Possible Security

Page 23 highlights

Wireless Security White Paper 23 Authentication Infowave uses NTLM challenge/response authentication. Infowave sends no user information over the link other than the encrypted NTLM token. Authorization Once it has authenticated the user, the Infowave server determines what resources the user is authorized and licensed to access. The Infowave server grants or denies access to the Exchange mailbox, for example. It also sends an authentication request back to the Infowave client software. The authentication request is processed using the NTLM credentials cached on the client device. Encryption For asymmetric encryption, Infowave uses the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) encryption algorithm from the Certicom Security Builder toolkit. The Infowave server maintains a private and public key pair that is generated on installation. Infowave clients know the server's public key and use it to perform the symmetric key exchange for all data transfers. ECC is significantly faster than the standard RSA encryption algorithms, and is well suited to mobile devices. The Wireless Business Engine is designed to support a number of different encryption algorithm combinations. The Certicom ECC/DESX combination is the currently implemented algorithm pair, but an arbitrary number of algorithms can be supported. For symmetric encryption, Infowave uses DESX, a strengthened variant of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) method of encryption that originated at IBM in 1977. Infowave randomly generates a DESX symmetric key pair on each client every time the client logs on. This key pair is used to encrypt session traffic. Data Integrity Infowave compresses, encrypts, and delivers data using its wireless protocol. The Infowave server analyzes the data to determine the best compression algorithm. The combination of encryption and compression ensures that data cannot be altered during transmission. If data shows signs of having been altered, the receiving side of the exchange does not accept it. Non-repudiation If the Infowave client software falls into unfriendly hands, the attacker can gain knowledge only of the Infowave server public key and the number of the access port. The breach of this information is not critical. Without knowing the user's Windows NT domain name, user ID, and password, the attacker can get no further than the Infowave server. The Windows NT domain name is combined with other information and encrypted with the server's public key, which keeps an attacker from impersonating a valid user. Possible Security Problem There may be a significant problem with Infowave security in that the client is not able to validate the public key of the Infowave server (WBE). This implies vulnerability to a "man-in-the-middle" attack where a client request is intercepted and then relayed to the server. The man in the middle can then eavesdrop on the entire transmission. According to Infowave, this design decision was made to support server public key download at the cost of the potential security hole mentioned above. At the time the design was implemented, the client-side libraries did not support signing of the server public key. This will be changed in future versions.

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Wireless Security White Paper
23
Authentication
Infowave uses NTLM challenge/response authentication. Infowave sends no user information
over the link other than the encrypted NTLM token.
Authorization
Once it has authenticated the user, the Infowave server determines what resources the user is
authorized and licensed to access. The Infowave server grants or denies access to the Exchange
mailbox, for example. It also sends an authentication request back to the Infowave client
software. The authentication request is processed using the NTLM credentials cached on the
client device.
Encryption
For asymmetric encryption, Infowave uses the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) encryption
algorithm from the Certicom
Security Builder
toolkit. The Infowave server maintains a private
and public key pair that is generated on installation. Infowave clients know the server’s public key
and use it to perform the symmetric key exchange for all data transfers. ECC is significantly
faster than the standard RSA encryption algorithms, and is well suited to mobile devices. The
Wireless Business Engine is designed to support a number of different encryption algorithm
combinations. The Certicom ECC/DESX combination is the currently implemented algorithm
pair, but an arbitrary number of algorithms can be supported.
For symmetric encryption, Infowave uses DESX, a strengthened variant of the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) method of encryption that originated at IBM in 1977. Infowave randomly
generates a DESX symmetric key pair on each client every time the client logs on. This key pair
is used to encrypt session traffic.
Data Integrity
Infowave compresses, encrypts, and delivers data using its wireless protocol. The Infowave
server analyzes the data to determine the best compression algorithm. The combination of
encryption and compression ensures that data cannot be altered during transmission. If data shows
signs of having been altered, the receiving side of the exchange does not accept it.
Non-repudiation
If the Infowave client software falls into unfriendly hands, the attacker can gain knowledge only
of the Infowave server public key and the number of the access port. The breach of this
information is not critical. Without knowing the user’s Windows NT domain name, user ID, and
password, the attacker can get no further than the Infowave server. The Windows NT domain
name is combined with other information and encrypted with the server’s public key, which keeps
an attacker from impersonating a valid user.
Possible Security Problem
There may be a significant problem with Infowave security in that the client is not able to validate
the public key of the Infowave server (WBE). This implies vulnerability to a "man-in-the-middle"
attack where a client request is intercepted and then relayed to the server. The man in the middle
can then eavesdrop on the entire transmission.
According to Infowave, this design decision was made to support server public key download at
the cost of the potential security hole mentioned above. At the time the design was implemented,
the client-side libraries did not support signing of the server public key. This will be changed in
future versions.