Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 87

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FPT_STM.1 (Reliable time stamps)

The TOE records the date (year-month-day) and time (hour-minute-second) for the audit log using the

system clock of the TOE.

FPT_TST.1 (TSF testing)

The TOE runs a suite of self tests during the initial start-up after the power is supplied.

For the FCU, the TOE provides the users with the verification information to verify the integrity of

executable code of the control software. The users compare the verification information from the TOE to the

verification information described in the guidance document, and verify the integrity of the FCU. If no errors

are detected, the users can use the TOE.

For configurations other than the FCU, the integrity of executable code of the MFP Control Software and

audit log data files is verified. If errors are detected by the integrity verification of executable code of the

MFP Control Software, an error message appears on the Operation Panel. The TOE is deactivated and

normal users cannot use the TOE. If errors are detected by the integrity verification of the audit log data files,

an error message appears on the Operation Panel. The TOE is deactivated and normal users cannot use the

TOE. If no errors are detected by both of these verifications, the TOE is activated and users can use it.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 (Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces)

The TOE inputs the information after the TSF identifies and authenticates the input information from the

Operation Panel or LAN interface. Therefore, the input information cannot be forwarded without the TSF

interaction. For the input information from the telephone line, the TOE specifies the Fax Reception Function

as the only available function from the telephone lines, and denies the communication that does not conform

to the fax protocol. Since the function, which conforms to the fax protocol, to forward data is prohibited at

the initial setting, no data is forwarded.

The TSF restricts the Operation Panel, LAN interface and telephone line, therefore, the forwarding of data is

not performed without any processing.

FTA_SSL.3 (TSF-initiated termination)

The TOE provides the function to forcibly logout after the user logs in from the Operation Panel and the auto

logout time elapses from the last operation from the Operation Panel. The auto logout time (180 seconds by

default) is specified by the administrator with machine management privilege.

The TOE provides the function to forcibly logout after the user logs in from a Web browser, and the fixed

auto log out time (30 minutes by default) elapses from the last operation from a Web browser.

This TOE has the interface from the printer driver, and provides the function to forcibly logout after it

receives the print data from the printer driver. It also has the interface from the fax driver, and provides the

function to forcibly logout after it receives the transmission information from the fax driver.

FTP_ITC.1 (Inter-TSF trusted channel)

The TOE provides SSL encrypted communication as a trusted channel to protect the LAN communication

between the TOE and a client computer, which is a trusted IT product, for the operations via a Web browser

of client computer, and the operations of printing, fax transmission, and fax data storage from client

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 87

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel - power

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