Ricoh C400DN Security Target - Page 67

Page 66 of 91 FTP_ITC.1.1 FTP_ITC.1.2 FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: communication via the LAN of document data, function data, protected data, and confidential data, and communication with RC Gate via the LAN]. 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL3+ALC_FLR.2. Table 30 lists the assurance components of the TOE. ALC_FLR.2 was added to the set of components defined in evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3). Table 30 : TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL3+ALC_FLR.2) Assurance Classes ADV: Development AGD: Guidance documents ALC: Life-cycle support ASE: Security Target evaluation ATE: Tests ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.3 ADV_TDS.2 AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1 ALC_CMC.3 ALC_CMS.3 ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DVS.1 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_FLR.2 ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1 ASE_INT.1 ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_REQ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_TSS.1 ATE_COV.2 ATE_DPT.1 ATE_FUN.1 Assurance Components Security architecture description Functional specification with complete summary Architectural design Operational user guidance Preparative procedures Authorisation controls Implementation representation CM coverage Delivery procedures Identification of security measures Developer defined life-cycle model Flaw reporting procedures Conformance claims Extended components definition ST introduction Security objectives Derived security requirements Security problem definition TOE summary specification Analysis of coverage Testing: basic design Functional testing Copyright (c) 2012 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.