Ricoh Aficio MP 2851 Security Target - Page 62

Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FIA_UID.1

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Page 62 of 81 Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FIA_UID.1 Since this TOE employs FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1, the dependency on FIA_UID.1 is satisfied by FIA_UAU.2 and FMR_SMR.1. 6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale This TOE is a commercially available product. It is assumed that it will be used in general offices, and that the possibility of basic security attacks on this TOE exists. Architectural design (ADV_TDS.2) is adequate to show the validity of commercially available products. A high attack potential is required for attacks that circumvent or tamper with the TSF, which is not covered in this evaluation. The vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs. However, protection of the secrecy of relevant information is required to make security attacks more difficult, and it is important to ensure a secure development environment. Development security (ACL_DVS.1) is therefore important also. Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL3 is appropriate for this TOE. Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.

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Page 62 of 81
Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.
Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FIA_UID.1
Since this TOE employs FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1, the dependency on FIA_UID.1 is
satisfied by FIA_UAU.2 and FMR_SMR.1.
6.3.4
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
This TOE is a commercially available product. It is assumed that it will be used in general offices, and that
the possibility of basic security attacks on this TOE exists. Architectural design (ADV_TDS.2) is adequate to
show the validity of commercially available products. A high attack potential is required for attacks that
circumvent or tamper with the TSF, which is not covered in this evaluation. The vulnerability analysis
(AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs.
However, protection of the secrecy of relevant information is required to make security attacks more difficult,
and it is important to ensure a secure development environment. Development security (ACL_DVS.1) is
therefore important also.
Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL3 is appropriate for this
TOE.