Ricoh Aficio MP C3001 Security Target - Page 53

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

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Page 52 of 93 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.2.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection: prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [assignment: no other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: the MFP administrators] with the capability to read [assignment: all of log items] from the audit records. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. 6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm in Table 13] and Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

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Page 52 of
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Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to
[selection: prevent]
unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to:
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies:
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall
[selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records]
and
[assignment: no
other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
if the audit trail
is full
.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide
[assignment: the MFP administrators]
with the capability to read
[assignment: all of log items]
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2
Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
6.1.2
Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm in Table 13]
and