Ricoh Aficio MP 2550B Security Target - Page 34

Interception and Tampering of Communication Path

Page 34 highlights

Page 34 of 83 T.SALVAGE (Salvaging Memory) To counter this threat, the TOE converts the format of Document Data by O.MEM.PROTECT that makes it difficult to read and decode if the HDD is installed in IT products other than the TOE. In addition, the performance of O.MEM.PROTECT is recorded as audit logs by O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit logs is only provided to the Machine Administrator so that the Machine Administrator detects afterwards whether or not O.MEM.PROTECT was successfully performed. Therefore, the TOE can counter T.SALVAGE. T.TRANSIT (Interception and Tampering of Communication Path) To counter this threat, the TOE protects Document Data and Print Data on communication path from leakage, and detects tampering. In addition, the performance of O.NET.PROTECT is recorded as audit logs by O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit logs is only provided to the Machine Administrator so that the Machine Administrator verifies afterwards whether or not O.NET.PROTECT was performed. Therefore, the TOE can counter T.TRANSIT. T.FAX_LINE (Intrusion from Telephone Line) To counter this threat, the TOE prevents the intrusion from a telephone line connected to Fax Unit to the TOE by O.LINE_PROTECT. In addition, the performance of O.LINE_PROTECT is recorded as audit logs by O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit logs is only provided to the Machine Administrator so that the Machine Administrator detects afterwards whether or not O.LINE_PROTECT was successfully performed. Therefore, the TOE can counter T.FAX_LINE. P.SOFTWARE (Checking Integrity of Software) To counter this organisational security policy, the TOE provides the function to verify the integrity of MFP Control Software, which is installed in FlashROM, with the TOE users by O.GENUINE. Therefore, the TOE can counter P.SOFTWARE. Copyright (c) 2009,2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.

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Page 34 of 83
T.SALVAGE
(Salvaging Memory)
To counter this threat, the TOE converts the format of Document Data by O.MEM.PROTECT that makes it
difficult to read and decode if the HDD is installed in IT products other than the TOE. In addition, the
performance of O.MEM.PROTECT is recorded as audit logs by O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit
logs is only provided to the Machine Administrator so that the Machine Administrator detects afterwards
whether or not O.MEM.PROTECT was successfully performed.
Therefore, the TOE can counter T.SALVAGE.
T.TRANSIT
(Interception and Tampering of Communication Path)
To counter this threat, the TOE protects Document Data and Print Data on communication path from leakage,
and detects tampering. In addition, the performance of O.NET.PROTECT is recorded as audit logs by
O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit logs is only provided to the Machine Administrator so that the
Machine Administrator verifies afterwards whether or not O.NET.PROTECT was performed.
Therefore, the TOE can counter T.TRANSIT.
T.FAX_LINE
(Intrusion from Telephone Line)
To counter this threat, the TOE prevents the intrusion from a telephone line connected to Fax Unit to the
TOE by O.LINE_PROTECT. In addition, the performance of O.LINE_PROTECT is recorded as audit logs
by O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit logs is only provided to the Machine Administrator so that the
Machine Administrator detects afterwards whether or not O.LINE_PROTECT was successfully performed.
Therefore, the TOE can counter T.FAX_LINE.
P.SOFTWARE
(Checking Integrity of Software)
To counter this organisational security policy, the TOE provides the function to verify the integrity of MFP
Control Software, which is installed in FlashROM, with the TOE users by O.GENUINE.
Therefore, the TOE can counter P.SOFTWARE.
Copyright (c) 2009,2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.