Ricoh Aficio MP 2550B Security Target - Page 62

Table 24: Correspondence Table of Dependencies of TOE Security Functional Requirements

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Page 62 of 83 FTP_TRP.1 also protects Document Data on networks from leakage and detects the tampering by using a trusted path, which is described later, between the TOE and the remote users. For sending by e-mail from the TOE to client PC, Document Data or Print Data on network is protected from leakage and tampering is detected by using S/MIME in the mailing service. For use of web service, print service, and fax service from client PC, Document Data on networks is protected from leakage and tampering is detected by using the SSL protocol. O.GENUINE Protection of Integrity of MFP Control Software The following are the rationale for the functional requirements that correspond to O.GENUINE in Table 23 being appropriate to satisfy O.GENUINE. a) Check the integrity of MFP Control Software. To accomplish O.GENUINE, the integrity of MFP Control Software, which is installed in FlashROM, shall be verified. For this, FPT_TST.1 tests the integrity of the executable code of MFP Control Software, which is installed in FlashROM, and verifies its integrity at the TOE start-up. O.LINE_PROTECT Protection for Intrusion from Telephone Line The following are the rationale for the functional requirements that correspond to O.LINE_PROTECT in Table 23 being appropriate to satisfy O. LINE_PROTECT. a) Prohibit the intrusion of fax line. To accomplish O.LINE_PROTECT, the unauthorised access to the TOE over a telephone line by attackers shall be prevented. For this, FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1 allow the fax data to pass from the fax process on the Fax Unit to the fax reception process on Controller Board only provided the received fax data from a telephone line is the fax data. 6.3.3 Dependency Analysis Table 24 shows the correspondence status of the dependencies in this ST for the TOE security functional requirements. Table 24: Correspondence Table of Dependencies of TOE Security Functional Requirements TOE Security Functional Requirements FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.2 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.4 FCS_CKM.1 Dependencies claimed by CC FPT_STM.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_STG.1 [FCS_CKM.2 or Dependencies satisfied in ST FPT_STM.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_STG.1 FCS_COP.1 Dependencies not satisfied in ST None None None None None FCS_CKM.4 Copyright (c) 2009,2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.

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Page 62 of 83
FTP_TRP.1 also protects Document Data on networks from leakage and detects the tampering by using
a trusted path, which is described later, between the TOE and the remote users. For sending by e-mail
from the TOE to client PC, Document Data or Print Data on network is protected from leakage and
tampering is detected by using S/MIME in the mailing service. For use of web service, print service,
and fax service from client PC, Document Data on networks is protected from leakage and tampering is
detected by using the SSL protocol.
O.GENUINE
Protection of Integrity of MFP Control Software
The following are the rationale for the functional requirements that correspond to O.GENUINE in Table 23
being appropriate to satisfy O.GENUINE.
a)
Check the integrity of MFP Control Software.
To accomplish O.GENUINE, the integrity of MFP Control Software, which is installed in FlashROM,
shall be verified.
For this, FPT_TST.1 tests the integrity of the executable code of MFP Control Software, which is
installed in FlashROM, and verifies its integrity at the TOE start-up.
O.LINE_PROTECT
Protection for Intrusion from Telephone Line
The following are the rationale for the functional requirements that correspond to O.LINE_PROTECT in
Table 23 being appropriate to satisfy O. LINE_PROTECT.
a)
Prohibit the intrusion of fax line.
To accomplish O.LINE_PROTECT, the unauthorised access to the TOE over a telephone line by
attackers shall be prevented.
For this, FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1 allow the fax data to pass from the fax process on the Fax Unit to
the fax reception process on Controller Board only provided the received fax data from a telephone line
is the fax data.
6.3.3
Dependency Analysis
Table 24 shows the correspondence status of the dependencies in this ST for the TOE security functional
requirements.
Table 24: Correspondence Table of Dependencies of TOE Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Dependencies
claimed by CC
Dependencies
satisfied in ST
Dependencies not
satisfied in ST
FAU_GEN.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_STM.1
None
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.1
None
FAU_STG.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_STG.4
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.1
None
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
Copyright (c) 2009,2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.