Ricoh Aficio MP 2851 Security Target - Page 61

Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4

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Page 61 of 81 TOE security functional requirements FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FIA_AFL.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_SOS.1 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UID.2 FIA_USB.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_TST.1 FTP_ITC.1 FTP_TRP.1 Dependencies claimed by CC FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FIA_UAU.1 None None FIA_UID.1 FIA_UAU.1 None FIA_ATD.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 None FIA_UID.1 None None None None Dependencies satisfied in ST FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FIA_UAU.2 None None FIA_UID.2 FIA_UAU.2 None FIA_ATD.1 FDP_ACC.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 None FIA_UID.2 None None None None Dependencies not satisfied in ST None None FIA_UAU.1 None None FIA_UID.1 FIA_UAU.1 None None None None None None FIA_UID.1 None None None None The following explains the rationale of acceptability in all cases where a dependency is not satisfied: Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4 In this TOE, the HDD encryption keys are stored in an area that cannot be accessed from outside the Ic Hdd. In addition, after the administrator generates the encryption keys at the start of TOE operation,deletion of the older encryption keys is not performed: they are overwritten with the new encryption keys. For these reasons, encryption key destruction by the standard method is unnecessary. Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FIA_UAU.1 Since this TOE employs FIA_UAU.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1, the dependency on FIA_UAU.1 is satisfied by FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.7. Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.

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Page 61 of 81
Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.
TOE security
functional
requirements
Dependencies
claimed by CC
Dependencies
satisfied in ST
Dependencies not
satisfied in ST
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1
None
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3
None
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1
None
None
None
FIA_SOS.1
None
None
None
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.2
None
None
None
FIA_USB.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_ATD.1
None
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
None
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
None
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
None
FMT_SMF.1
None
None
None
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2
FIA_UID.1
FPT_STM.1
None
None
None
FPT_TST.1
None
None
None
FTP_ITC.1
None
None
None
FTP_TRP.1
None
None
None
The following explains the rationale of acceptability in all cases where a dependency is not satisfied:
Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4
In this TOE, the HDD encryption keys are stored in an area that cannot be accessed from outside the Ic Hdd.
In addition, after the administrator generates the encryption keys at the start of TOE operation, deletion of
the older encryption keys is not performed: they are overwritten with the new encryption keys. For these
reasons, encryption key destruction by the standard method is unnecessary.
Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FIA_UAU.1
Since this TOE employs FIA_UAU.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1, the dependency on FIA_UAU.1
is satisfied by FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.7.