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Prevention of Access to Address Book Data and Machine Management Data

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Print Controller Design Guide for Information Security 4-3-3 Prevention of Access to Address Book Data and Machine Management Data By calling the DMP (Device Management Package), SDK applications are able to view and change the contents and settings of the MFP/LP Address Book. However, these operations are limited to those users who have been authenticated by the CCS. As mentioned in section 1.2.1, the Address Book data is managed by the UCS. For details, refer to section 1.7. 4-3-4 Protection Against Attacks on Principal MFP/LP Functions, Prevention of Damage to the System Buffer Overflow Attacks on the MFP/LP VM After completing the development of the SDK application, the Vendor must apply to Ricoh for the items necessary to carry out the SDK Authentication and/or Digital Authentication processes described above, and at that time declare the expected VM consumption of the application. The proper method for measuring VM is described in the SDK Development Kit provided by Ricoh to the Vendor. Ricoh then performs tests on the proposed application to verify that the actual VM consumption matches that which the Vendor has stated on the application form, and then makes a judgment as to whether or not to approve the application and provide the Vendor with the requested authentication items. Alteration or Deletion of MFP/LP Principal Function Program Objects As mentioned above in section 3.1, each SDK application is installed in its own unique directory on the HDD, which is determined by its unique product ID. It is impossible for the application to access any other areas. Even in the event that an SDK application attempted to write a large amount of data to the SD card or MFP/LP HDD, e.g. with the aim of rendering machine principal functions unable to write data, this would not succeed since the application cannot access any area aside of its own isolated partition on the HDD. In addition, as a general rule, Ricoh prohibits SDK applications from writing to any machine media or SD cards. Even in cases where Ricoh has given the application writing capabilities upon request from the Vendor, the application is only able to write to a specialized SD card for SDK applications. 4-3-5 Protection Against Attacks from External Sources As mentioned in section 2.3, an SDK application is able to perform network communication either by using the NCS (Type 1) or by opening and closing its own unique socket (Types 1 and 2). In the latter case, all communication including the content of all messages and data exchanged is encrypted, and specialized protocols and authentication procedures are employed. As a result, these safeguards protect the MFP/LP from any attacks from external sources. Page 85 of 86

Section	Page
04/23/2010	1
For these details, please refer to the Operating Instructions for the specific machine in question.	6
Hardware Configuration	7
MFP	7
LP	9
TPM (Trusted Platform Module): When the MFP/LP main power is turned on, this security module (chip) performs a verification on the validity of the software installed on the hardware platform, which includes checking for any illegal alterations.	10
Shared Service Layers	11
Principal Machine Functions	12
Data Security	14
External I/F	14
Protection of Program Data from Illegal Access via an External Device	14
IC card-based authentication functions: Authentication is mutual and encrypted, which prevents impersonation and ensures that data is properly protected.	16
Firmware Installation/Update	17
Remote Firmware Installation via Web SmartDeviceMonitor Professional IS (performed by the end user)	19
Verification of Firmware/Program Validity	20
Note: Produced by STMicroelectronics, TPM is a product of the ST19WP18 family, which has earned Common Criteria certification (EAL5+).	20
Authentication	21
IC Card Authentication	24
Access Control	25
In addition, it is possible to create an access control list (ACL) for each individual Address Book entry and Document Server document at both the individual user and group levels.	25
If the MLP/LP is initialized in this way, all of the user information, document data, and settings stored in the MLP/LP since installation will be initialized (erased).	26
Data Erase/Overwrite	27
To execute the overwrite, the operator can choose from two options: \	28
The execution of this feature does not clear engine-related information such as the value of the total counter, or engine-related adjustment settings contained in SP mode and UP mode.	28
Through this arrangement, the copy of the HDD storage key is automatically decrypted once the Encryption Key Restore has been completed.	31
Document Server Documents (MFP models only)	33
Access Privileges and Operations for Stored Documents	34
Without HDD: 500 entries	38
Overview of Capture Operations	39
Operations that Generate Captured Images	39
Capture Settings	41
Security Considerations	42
Captured Documents and Log Data	42
Additional Methods for Increased Security	42
(Authentication not required)	42
Copier (MFP Models Only)	43
Overview of Copier Operations	43
Data Security Considerations	43
Protection of Copy Jobs in Progress	43
Protection of Document Server Documents	43
Refer to 1.7.2 Document Server Documents (MFP models only) for details on the Document Lock feature.	44
Restricting the Available Functions for Each Individual User	45
Job/Access Log Data Collection	45
Print Backup	45
(printing out, editing, copying).	46
Overview of Printer Operations	47
Data Flow	47
Data Security Considerations	51
The \	53
Overview of Scanner Operations	54
Data Flow Security Considerations	54
Protection of Data when Performing Scanning and Sending Operations	55
Protection of Document Server Documents	56
Protection of Sending Results and Status Information	57
Protection of the Scanner Features Settings	57
Data Stored in the Job Log	58
Terminology	58
FTP (File Transfer Protocol): A protocol used when transferring files over a TCP/IP network.	58
Overview of FAX operations	59
Data Security Considerations	60
Protection of the Journal and Documents in Document Server Storage	61
Protection of FAX Transmission Operations	61
Protection of FAX Features Settings	62
The \	62
Job Log	62
Protection of Internet FAX Transmissions using S/MIME	62
Preventing FAX Transmission to Unintended Destination(s)	63
This prevents a FAX from being sent to an unintended destination when, for example, the operator accidentally touches an additional Quick Dial key.	63
Overview of NetFile Operations	64
Data Flow	65
Supplementary	65
Network Topology for a System Using Integration Server Authentication (Sample)	66
As long as the track ID is not stolen from the communication path between the PC and MFP/LP (which can be protected against by enabling SSL encryption) or from the PC itself, it is impossible to perform any unauthorized operations on these print jobs	68
Web Server Framework	69
WebDocBox (MFP models only)	70
For more details on job and access logs, please refer to 1.9 Job/Access Logs.	72
@Remote	73
Overview of @Remote Operations	73
Data Security Considerations	73
Security is increased even further by the fact that the symmetric key used is not a static key, but rather one that is generated every time a new session is initiated.	73
Overview of Copy Data Security Operations	74
Data Flow	75
Following this, an entry for the event itself is stored in the access log, along with the username.	75
Overview of Operations	77
1	77
Overview of SDK Application Functions	79
3: DSDK Œ MFP/LP Hardware Configuration	79
Scanning Functions: Sending Data Over the Network with the Copier and Scanner (MFP models only)	80
FAX Functions (MFP models only)	80
Network Functions	81
Printer Functions	81
Machine Administrative Functions (MFP models only)	81
Authentication Functions	81
Data Security Considerations	83
Preventing the Installation of Illegal Applications	83
Authentication of SDK Applications at Installation	83
Prevention of Access to Address Book Data and Machine Management Data	85
Protection Against Attacks on Principal MFP/LP Functions, Prevention of Damage to the System	85
Protection Against Attacks from External Sources	85

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Print Controller Design Guide for Information Security

Page 85 of 86

4-3-3 Prevention of Access to Address Book Data and Machine Management Data

By calling the DMP (Device Management Package), SDK applications are able to view and change the

contents and settings of the MFP/LP Address Book. However, these operations are limited to those

users who have been authenticated by the CCS.

As mentioned in section 1.2.1, the Address Book data is managed by the UCS. For details, refer to

section 1.7.

4-3-4 Protection Against Attacks on Principal MFP/LP Functions, Prevention of

Damage to the System

Buffer Overflow Attacks on the MFP/LP VM

After completing the development of the SDK application, the Vendor must apply to Ricoh for the items

necessary to carry out the SDK Authentication and/or Digital Authentication processes described

above, and at that time declare the expected VM consumption of the application. The proper method

for measuring VM is described in the SDK Development Kit provided by Ricoh to the Vendor. Ricoh

then performs tests on the proposed application to verify that the actual VM consumption matches that

which the Vendor has stated on the application form, and then makes a judgment as to whether or not

to approve the application and provide the Vendor with the requested authentication items.

Alteration or Deletion of MFP/LP Principal Function Program Objects

As mentioned above in section 3.1, each SDK application is installed in its own unique directory on the

HDD, which is determined by its unique product ID. It is impossible for the application to access any

other areas.

Even in the event that an SDK application attempted to write a large amount of data to the SD card or

MFP/LP HDD, e.g. with the aim of rendering machine principal functions unable to write data, this

would not succeed since the application cannot access any area aside of its own isolated partition on

the HDD. In addition, as a general rule, Ricoh prohibits SDK applications from writing to any machine

media or SD cards. Even in cases where Ricoh has given the application writing capabilities upon

request from the Vendor, the application is only able to write to a specialized SD card for SDK

applications.

4-3-5 Protection Against Attacks from External Sources

As mentioned in section 2.3, an SDK application is able to perform network communication either by

using the NCS (Type 1) or by opening and closing its own unique socket (Types 1 and 2). In the latter

case, all communication including the content of all messages and data exchanged is encrypted, and

specialized protocols and authentication procedures are employed. As a result, these safeguards

protect the MFP/LP from any attacks from external sources.