Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 29

of

87

2600.1-SMI conformant

2.4

Conformance Claim Rationale

2.4.1

Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP

The targeted product type by the PP is the Hardcopy devices (hereafter, HCDs). The HCDs consist of the

scanner device and print device, and have the interface to connect telephone line. The HCDs combine these

devices and equip one or more functions of Copy Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function or Fax

Function. The Document Server Function is also available when installing the non-volatile memory medium,

such as hard disk drive, as additional equipments.

The MFP is the type of this TOE. The MFP has the devices the HCDs have, and equips the functions that

HCDs equip including the additional equipments. Therefore, this TOE type is consistent with the TOE type

in the PP.

2.4.2

Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP

Defining all security problems in the PP, P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION was added to the security problem

definitions in chapter 3.

Defining all security objectives in the PP, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED was added to the security objectives

in chapter 4. P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED encrypt data on the HDD, and

satisfy both other organisational security policies in the PP and security objectives of the TOE. Therefore,

the security problems and security objectives in this ST are consistent with the ones in the PP.

Although the PP is written in English, the security problem definitions in chapter 3 and security objectives in

chapter 4 are translated from English PP into Japanese. In translating into Japanese, if the literal translation

of the PP was judged to make it difficult for readers to understand the PP, the translation was made easily

comprehensible, however, its description is not deviated from the requirements of the PP conformance. Also,

the description is neither increased nor decreased.

2.4.3

Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP

The SFRs for this TOE consist of those found in the Common Security Functional Requirements and SFR

Packages 2600.1-PRT, 2600.1-SCN, 2600.1-CPY, 2600.1-FAX, 2600.1-DSR, and 2600.1-SMI, and conform

to the PP.

FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, and FAU_SAR.2 are added according to PP APPLICATION

NOTE7 in order for the TOE to maintain and manage the audit logs.

For the authentication function of the TOE, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_SOS.1 are added according

to PP APPLICATION NOTE36.

For the ownership of the received fax documents, the TOE has the characteristic that the ownership of the

document is assigned to the intended user. This is according to PP APPLICATION NOTE 93.

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 29

Conformance Claim Rationale

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