Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 55

of

87

(2)

Registrable password length:

For normal users:

No fewer than the Minimum Password Length specified by MFP administrator (8-32 characters) and no

more than 128 characters.

For MFP administrators and a supervisor:

No fewer than the Minimum Password Length specified by MFP administrator (8-32 characters) and no

more than 32 characters.

(3)

Rule:

Passwords that are composed of a combination of characters based on the Password Complexity Setting

specified by the MFP administrator can be registered. The MFP administrator specifies either Level 1 or

Level 2 for Password Complexity Setting.

FIA_UAU.1

Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.1.1

The TSF shall allow

[assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, Web Image Monitor

Help from a Web browser, system status, counter and information of inquiries, and

execution of fax reception]

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is

authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other

TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.7

Protected authentication feedback

Hierarchical to:


Dependencies:

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.7.1

The TSF shall provide only

[assignment: displaying dummy letters as authentication

feedback on the Operation Panel]

to the user while the authentication is in progress.

FIA_UID.1

Timing of identification

Hierarchical to:


Dependencies:

No dependencies.

FIA_UID.1.1

The TSF shall allow

[assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, Web Image Monitor

Help from a Web browser, system status, counter and information of inquiries, and

execution of fax reception]

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other

TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_USB.1

User-subject binding

Hierarchical to:


Dependencies:

FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 55

FIA_UAU.1, Timing of authentication, FIA_UAU.7, Protected authentication feedback, FIA_UID.1, Timing

Page 55 highlights