Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 33

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3.2

Organisational Security Policies

The following organisational security policies are taken:

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION

User identification and authentication

Only users with a login user name shall be authorised to use the TOE.

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION

Software verification

Procedures shall exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.

P.AUDIT.LOGGING

Management of audit log records

The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events. The

audit log shall be protected from unauthorised disclosure or alteration, and shall be

reviewed by authorised persons.

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT

Management of external interfaces

To prevent unauthorised use of the external interfaces of the TOE (Operation Panel,

LAN, USB and telephone lines), operation of those interfaces shall be controlled by the

TOE and its IT environment.

P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION

Encryption of storage devices

The TOE shall encrypt the stored data on the HDD inside the TOE.

3.3

Assumptions

The assumptions related to this TOE usage environment are identified and described.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED

Access management

According to the guidance document, the TOE is placed in a restricted or monitored

area that provides protection from physical access by unauthorised persons.

A.USER.TRAINING

User training

The responsible manager of MFP trains users according to the guidance document and

users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation and are

competent to follow those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING

Administrator training

Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation,

are competent to correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with the

guidance document following those policies and procedures.

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 33

Organisational Security Policies, Assumptions

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