Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 49

of

87

Table 14: List of Cryptographic Operation

Key Type

Standard

Cryptographic

Algorithm

Cryptographic

Key Size

Cryptographic Operation

HDD

cryptographic

key

FIPS197

AES

256 bits

- Encryption when writing the data

on HDD

- Decryption when reading the data

from HDD

6.1.3

Class FDP: User data protection

FDP_ACC.1(a) Subset access control

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the

[assignment: common access control SFP]

on

[assignment: list of

subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects in Table 15]

.

Table 15: List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (a)

Subjects

Objects

Operations among Subjects and Objects

MFP

administrator

process

User document

Delete

Supervisor process

User document

None

Normal user process

User document

Delete,

print,

download,

fax,

e-mail

transmission and folder transmission

MFP

administrator

process

User job

Delete

Normal user process

Applicable user job

Delete

FDP_ACC.1(b) Subset access control

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1(b) The TSF shall enforce the

[assignment: TOE function access control SFP]

on

[assignment:

list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects in Table 16]

.

Table 16: List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (b)

Subjects

Objects

Operations among Subjects and Objects

Normal user process

MFP application

Execute

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 49

Table 15: List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects

Page 49 highlights