Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 78

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FIA_AFL.1 (Authentication failure handling)

The TOE counts the number of failed identification and authentication attempts made under each login user

name. When a user authenticates successfully, the TOE resets the number of available authentication

attempts for that user to 0.

When the number of failed consecutive attempts reaches the MFP administrator-specified Number of

Attempts before Lockout, the TOE locks out that user.

The MFP administrator specifies 1 to 5 as the Number of Attempts before Lockout.

The TOE releases the lockout for the user who satisfies any of the following:

(1)

Lockout release by a time-based operation

If a user fails to authenticate after making the number of attempts specified to initiate lockout, and the

lockout time has elapsed, then lockout will be released. The MFP administrator specifies the lockout

time (60 minutes by default). The elapsed time from the initiation of lockout is timed for each locked out

user.

(2)

Lockout release by unlocking administrator

The unlocking administrator specified for each user role releases the lockout. Table 38 shows the

unlocking administrators for each user role.

Table 38: Unlocking Administrators for Each User Role

User Roles (Locked out Users)

Unlocking Administrators

Normal user

MFP administrator

Supervisor

MFP administrator

MFP administrator

Supervisor

(3)

Lockout release by turning on/off the TOE

If the administrators (MFP administrator and supervisor) are locked out, restarting the TOE releases the

lockout for them.

FIA_ATD.1 (User attribute definition)

The TOE associates the normal user with a login user name of normal user and available function list,

supervisor with a login user name of supervisor, and MFP administrator with a login user name of MFP

administrator, as security attributes, and it maintains these associations.

FIA_SOS.1 (Verification of secrets)

The TOE provides a function for registering and changing the login passwords of normal users, MFP

administrators, and supervisor. This function uses the characters described below in (1).

It checks if the registering or changing password meets the conditions (2) and (3). If it does, the TOE

registers the login password. If it does not, it does not register the login password and displays an error

message.

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 78

Table 38: Unlocking Administrators for Each User Role

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