Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 71

of

87

(1)

Generate appropriate cryptographic keys.

FCS_CKM.1 generates the cryptographic key for encryption.

(2)

Perform cryptographic operation.

FCS_COP.1 encrypts the data to be stored in the HDD, and decrypts the data to be read from the HDD.

(3)

Manage the TSF data.

FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator to manage the cryptographic keys.

(4)

Specification of Management Function.

FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.

(5)

Specification of the roles.

FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.

By satisfying FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1, which are the

security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is fulfilled.

6.3.3

Dependency Analysis

Table 35 shows the result of dependency analysis in this ST for the TOE security functional requirements.

Table 35: Result of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements

TOE Security

Functional

Requirements

Claimed

Dependencies

Dependencies

Satisfied in ST

Dependencies

Not Satisfied in

ST

FAU_GEN.1

FPT_STM.1

FPT_STM.1

None

FAU_GEN.2

FAU_GEN.1

FIA_UID.1

FAU_GEN.1

FIA_UID.1

None

FAU_STG.1

FAU_GEN.1

FAU_GEN.1

None

FAU_STG.4

FAU_STG.1

FAU_STG.1

None

FAU_SAR.1

FAU_GEN.1

FAU_GEN.1

None

FAU_SAR.2

FAU_SAR.1

FAU_SAR.1

None

FCS_CKM.1

[FCS_CKM.2 or

FCS_COP.1]

FCS_CKM.4

FCS_COP.1

FCS_CKM.4

FCS_COP.1

[FDP_ITC.1 or

FDP_ITC.2 or

FCS_CKM.1]

FCS_CKM.4

FCS_CKM.1

FCS_CKM.4

FDP_ACC.1(a)

FDP_ACF.1(a)

FDP_ACF.1(a)

None

FDP_ACC.1(b)

FDP_ACF.1(b)

FDP_ACF.1(b)

None

FDP_ACF.1(a)

FDP_ACC.1(a)

FMT_MSA.3(a)

FDP_ACC.1(a)

FMT_MSA.3(a)

None

FDP_ACF.1(b)

FDP_ACC.1(b)

FDP_ACC.1(b)

None

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 71

Table 35: Result of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements

Page 71 highlights