Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 68

of

87

(1)

Management of the TSF confidential data.

FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password

of normal user. A supervisor is allowed to operate the login password of supervisor. The supervisor and

applicable MFP administrator are allowed to operate the login password of MFP administrator. The

MFP administrator is only allowed to operate the audit log and HDD cryptographic key.

(2)

Specification of the Management Function.

FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.

(3)

Specification of the roles.

FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.

(4)

Use trusted channels for sending or receiving TSF confidential data.

The TSF confidential data sent and received from the LAN interface are protected by FTP_ITC.1.

By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional

requirements for these countermeasures, O.CONF.NO_DIS is fulfilled.

O.CONF.NO_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration

O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to alter the

TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following

countermeasures.

(1)

Management of the TSF confidential data.

FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password

of normal user. A supervisor is allowed to operate the login password of supervisor. The supervisor and

applicable MFP administrator are allowed to operate the login password of MFP administrator. The

MFP administrator is only allowed to operate the audit log and newly create an HDD cryptographic

key.

(2)

Specification of the Management Function.

FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.

(3)

Specification of the roles.

FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.

(4)

Use trusted channels for sending or receiving TSF confidential data.

The TSF confidential data sent and received from the LAN interface are protected by FTP_ITC.1.

By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional

requirements for these countermeasures, O.CONF.NO_ALT is fulfilled.

O.USER.AUTHORIZED User identification and authentication

O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective to restrict users so that only valid users can use the TOE

functions. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1)

Identify and authenticate the users prior to the TOE use.

FIA_UID.1 identifies the users prior to the TOE use.

FIA_UAU.1 authenticates the users if the user is the registered user or not prior to the TOE use.

(2)

Allow the successfully identified and authenticated user to use the TOE.

FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1 manage the access procedures to the protected assets of the users who are

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 68

O.CONF.NO_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration, O.USER.AUTHORIZED User identification

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