Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 69

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defined in advance, and associate the users who are successfully identified and authenticated with the

access procedures.

FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b) allow the applicable normal user to use the MFP application

according to the operation permission granted to the successfully identified and authenticated normal

user.

(3)

Complicate decoding of login password.

FIA_UAU.7 displays dummy letters as authentication feedback on the Operation Panel and prevents the

login password from disclosure.

FIA_SOS.1 accepts only passwords that satisfy the Minimum Password Length and password character

combination specified by the MFP administrator, and makes it difficult to guess the password.

FIA_AFL.1 does not allow the user who is unsuccessfully authenticated for certain times to access to

the TOE for certain period.

(4)

Terminate login automatically.

FTA_SSL.3 automatically logs out the user after no operation is performed from the Operation Panel

and a Web browser for certain period and the auto logout time elapses. It also logs out the status of

document data reception after the completion of document data reception from the printer driver or fax

driver.

(5)

Management of the security attributes.

According to FMT_MSA.1(b), the login user name and available function list of normal user are

managed by the MFP administrator, and users are not allowed to operate the function type.

FMT_MSA.3(b) sets the permissive default value to the available function list, and sets the restrictive

default value to the function type.

By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(b), FDP_ACF.1(b), FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1,

FIA_UAU.7, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FTA_SSL.3, FMT_MSA.1(b) and FMT_MSA.3(b), which are the

security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.USER.AUTHORIZED is fulfilled.

The function for 2600.1-SMI (F.SMI), selected SFR Package from the PP, is used in conjunction with the

function whose access control is enforced by FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b). Therefore, the access

control for F.SMI is included with the access control by FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b) and fulfilled.

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED Management of external interfaces by TOE

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective to protect the communication path when the TOE

sends and receives the protected assets. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the

following countermeasures.

(1)

Identify and authenticate the users prior to use the Operation Panel and LAN interface.

FIA_UID.1 identifies the users prior to their use of the Operation panel and LAN interface.

FIA_UAU.1 authenticates the registered users prior to their use of the Operation Panel and LAN

interface.

(2)

Automatically terminate the connection to the Operation Panel and LAN interface.

FTA_SSL.3 terminates the session after no operation is performed from the Operation Panel or LAN

interface for certain period.

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 69

FIA_UAU.7, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FTA_SSL.3, FMT_MSA.1b and FMT_MSA.3b, which are

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