Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 46

of

87

covered by the SFP.

b) Basic: All requests to perform an

operation on an object covered by the

SFP.

c) Detailed: The specific security

attributes used in making an access

check.

storing user documents.

- Start and end operation of

printing user documents.


downloading user documents.


faxing user documents.


user

documents

e-mail

transmission.


user

documents

folder

transmission.


deleting user documents.

Above

described

"storing,

printing, downloading, faxing,

e-mail

transmission,

folder

transmission and deleting" are

the job types of additional

information that are required by

the PP.

FDP_ACF.1(b)

a) Minimal: Successful requests to

perform an operation on an object

covered by the SFP.

b) Basic: All requests to perform an

operation on an object covered by the

SFP.

c) Detailed: The specific security

attributes used in making an access

check.

Original: Not recorded.

FIA_UAU.1

a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the

authentication mechanism;

b) Basic: All use of the authentication

mechanism;

c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions

performed before authentication of the

user.

b) Basic: Success and failure of

login operation

FIA_UID.1

a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the

user

identification

mechanism,

including the user identity provided;

b)

Basic:

All

use

of

the

user

identification mechanism, including

the user identity provided.

b) Basic: Success and failure of

login operation. Also includes

the user identification that is

required by the PP as the

additional information.

FMT_SMF.1

a) Minimal: Use of the management

functions.

a)

Minimal:

Record

of

management items in Table 32.

FMT_SMR.1

a) Minimal: modifications to the

No

record

due

to

any

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 46

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