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Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

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Page 72 of 87 6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale This TOE is software for the MFP, which is a commercially available product. The MFP is assumed that it will be used in a general office and this TOE does not assume the attackers with the possibility of moderate or greater level attacks. Architectural design (ADV_TDS.2) is adequate to show the validity of commercially available products. A high attack potential is required for the attacks that circumvent or tamper with the TSF, which is not covered in this evaluation. The vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs. However, protection of the secrecy of relevant information is required to make security attacks more difficult, and it is important to ensure a secure development environment. Development security (ALC_DVS.1) is therefore important also. In order to securely operate the TOE continuously, it is important to appropriately remediate the flaw discovered after the start of TOE operation according to flow reporting procedure (ALC_FLR.2). Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL3+ALC_FLR.2 is appropriate for this TOE. Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

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Page 72 of

6.3.4

Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is software for the MFP, which is a commercially available product. The MFP is assumed that it

will be used in a general office and this TOE does not assume the attackers with the possibility of moderate

or greater level attacks.

Architectural design (ADV_TDS.2) is adequate to show the validity of commercially available products. A

high attack potential is required for the attacks that circumvent or tamper with the TSF, which is not covered

in this evaluation. The vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs.

However, protection of the secrecy of relevant information is required to make security attacks more difficult,

and it is important to ensure a secure development environment. Development security (ALC_DVS.1) is

therefore important also.

In order to securely operate the TOE continuously, it is important to appropriately remediate the flaw

discovered after the start of TOE operation according to flow reporting procedure (ALC_FLR.2).

Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL3+ALC_FLR.2 is

appropriate for this TOE.