Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 72

of

87

FMT_MSA.3(b)

FMT_MSA.3(b)

FDP_RIP.1

None

None

None

FIA_AFL.1

FIA_UAU.1

FIA_UAU.1

None

FIA_ATD.1

None

None

None

FIA_SOS.1

None

None

None

FIA_UAU.1

FIA_UID.1

FIA_UID.1

None

FIA_UAU.7

FIA_UAU.1

FIA_UAU.1

None

FIA_UID.1

None

None

None

FIA_USB.1

FIA_ATD.1

FIA_ATD.1

None

FPT_FDI_EXP.1

FMT_SMF.1

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

FMT_SMR.1

None

FMT_MSA.1(a)

[FDP_ACC.1(a) or

FDP_IFC.1]

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

FDP_ACC.1(a)

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

None

FMT_MSA.1(b)

[FDP_ACC.1(b)

or FDP_IFC.1]

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

FDP_ACC.1(b)

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

None

FMT_MSA.3(a)

FMT_MSA.1(a)

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_MSA.1(a)

FMT_SMR.1

None

FMT_MSA.3(b)

FMT_MSA.1(b)

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_MSA.1(b)

FMT_SMR.1

None

FMT_MTD.1

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

None

FMT_SMF.1

None

None

None

FMT_SMR.1

FIA_UID.1

FIA_UID.1

None

FPT_STM.1

None

None

None

FPT_TST.1

None

None

None

FTA_SSL.3

None

None

None

FTP_ITC.1

None

None

None

The following explains the rationale for acceptability in all cases where a dependency is not satisfied:

Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4

Once the MFP administrator generates the cryptographic key that is used for the HDD encryption of this

TOE at the start of TOE operation, the cryptographic key will be continuously used for the HDD and will not

be deleted. Therefore, cryptographic key destruction by the standard method is unnecessary.

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 72

Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4

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