Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 63

of

87

6.1.8

Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

FTP_ITC.1

Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

No dependencies.

FTP_ITC.1.1

The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product

that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification

of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2

The TSF shall permit

[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]

to initiate

communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for

[assignment: communication

via the LAN of document data, function data, protected data, and confidential data]

.

6.2

Security Assurance Requirements

The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL3+ALC_FLR.2. Table 33 lists the assurance components

of the TOE. ALC_FLR.2 was added to the set of components defined in evaluation assurance level 3

(EAL3).

Table 33: TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL3+ALC_FLR.2)

Assurance Classes

Assurance Components

ADV_ARC.1

Security architecture description

ADV_FSP.3

Functional specification with complete summary

ADV:

Development

ADV_TDS.2

Architectural design

AGD_OPE.1

Operational user guidance

AGD:

Guidance documents

AGD_PRE.1

Preparative procedures

ALC_CMC.3

Authorisation controls

ALC_CMS.3

Implementation representation CM coverage

ALC_DEL.1

Delivery procedures

ALC_DVS.1

Identification of security measures

ALC_LCD.1

Developer defined life-cycle model

ALC:

Life-cycle support

ALC_FLR.2

Flaw reporting procedures

ASE_CCL.1

Conformance claims

ASE_ECD.1

Extended components definition

ASE_INT.1

ST introduction

ASE_OBJ.2

Security objectives

ASE_REQ.2

Derived security requirements

ASE:

Security Target evaluation

ASE_SPD.1

Security problem definition

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 63

Security Assurance Requirements

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