Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 82

of

87

(*1): If MFP administrator modifies the users for stored and received documents, and the document type of

document user list of user documents is the received fax document, the list is modified to the value of the

users for stored and received documents.

FMT_MSA.1(b) (Management of security attributes)

The TOE allows only specified users to operate the security attributes related to the TOE function access

control SFP from the specified operation interfaces.

Table 41 shows the list of security attributes that can be operated by the users, the permitted users to operate

each security attribute and their permitted operations, and the available operation interfaces.

Table 41: Security Attributes Management of TOE Function Access Control SFP

Security Attribute

Operation Interface

Operation

User

Newly create,

query,

modify,

delete

MFP administrator

Operation Panel

Web browser

Login user name of normal user

Normal user who owns

the

applicable

login

user name

Query

Query,

MFP administrator

modify

Operation Panel

Web browser

Available function list

Query

Applicable normal user

No

operation

interfaces available

No operations

permitted

Function type

-

-: No user roles are permitted for operations by the TOE.

FMT_MSA.3(a) (Static attribute initialisation)

The TOE sets the default value for the security attribute in Table 42 that corresponds to the object in Table

42 when generating the object listed in Table 42.

Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.

Section	Page
1 ST Introduction	7
1.1 ST Reference	7
1.2 TOE Reference	7
1.3 TOE Overview	9
1.3.1 TOE Type	9
1.3.2 TOE Usage	9
1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE	11
1.4 TOE Description	11
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE	11
1.4.2 Guidance Documents	14
1.4.3 Definition of Users	17
1.4.3.1. Direct User	19
1.4.3.2. Indirect User	19
1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE	20
1.4.4.1. Basic Functions	20
1.4.4.2. Security Functions	23
1.4.5 Protected Assets	24
1.4.5.1. User Data	24
1.4.5.2. TSF Data	25
1.4.5.3. Functions	25
1.5 Glossary	25
1.5.1 Glossary for This ST	25
2 Conformance Claim	28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim	28
2.2 PP Claims	28
2.3 Package Claims	28
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale	29
2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP	29
2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP	29
2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP	29
3 Security Problem Definitions	32
3.1 Threats	32
3.2 Organisational Security Policies	33
3.3 Assumptions	33
4 Security Objectives	35
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE	35
4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment	36
4.2.1 IT Environment	36
4.2.2 Non-IT Environment	37
	37
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale	38
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives	38
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions	39
5 Extended Components Definition	43
5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)	43
6 Security Requirements	45
6.1 Security Functional Requirements	45
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit	45
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support	48
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection	49
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication	53
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management	56
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	62
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access	62
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	63
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements	63
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale	64
6.3.1 Tracing	64
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability	65
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis	71
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	73

Ricoh Aficio MP 6001 SP Security Target - Page 82

Table 41: Security Attributes Management of TOE Function Access Control SFP

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